David E. Bates v. Christine L. Bates : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
David E. Bates v. Christine L. Bates : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mary C. Corporon; Corporon & Williams; attorney for respondent.
Edward K. Brass; attorney for appellant.
EDWARD K. BRASS Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 321 South 600 East Salt Lake City, Utah
84102 (801) 322-5678
MARY C. CORPORON #734 Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent CORPORON & WILLIAMS
Suite 1100 - Boston Building #9 Fxchange; Place Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 328-1162
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bates v. Bates, No. 890430 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2032
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID E. BATES, 
PI a intiff/Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 890430-CA 
Priority No. 14b 
CHRISTINE L. BATES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
An Appeal From a Judgment Modifying a Divorce Decree 
Entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge Presiding. 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Fxchange; Place 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 322-5678 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID E. BATES, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 890430-CA 
Priority No. 14b 
CHRISTINE L. BATES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
An Appeal From a Judgment Modifying a Divorce Decree 
Entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge Presiding. 
MARY C. CORPORON #7 34 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 322-5678 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTION 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR TN FINDING 
THE AVAILABILITY OF THE RETIREMENT FUNDS 
TO THE APPELLANT TO BE A CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH JUSTIFIED THE 
TERMINATION OF ALIMONY 
POINT II: THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN "REDUCING" 
APPELLANT'S SHARE IN THE RETIREMENT FUNDS . . 
CONCLUSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 7 
Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) 5 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) 6 
Thompson v. Thompson. 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985) 5 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988) . 4,8 
ii 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID E. BATES, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
-vs-
Case No, 890430-CA 
CHRISTINE L. BATES, Priority No. 14b 
Defendant/Appellant. 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT and submits the following 
as his brief in the appeal of the above-captioned action: 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals to 
decide the appeal in this action pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78 2a-3 (1987) and pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Smamit County, State of Utah, 
terminating plaintiff's alimony obligation to the defendant. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in modifying a 
divorce decree by terminating alimony originally awarded to the 
defendant/appellant in the Decree of Divorce? 
2. Did the trial court err in reducing the appellant's 
interest in the retirement accounts* 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no statutes or case law authorities thought by 
respondent to be determinative of this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent filed a petition to modify the Decree of Divorce 
in this action seeking termination of his alimony obligation 
because the early availability of retirement funds to the 
appellant constituted a material change in circumstance. A trial 
was held before the honorable J. Dennis Frederick/ District Court 
Judge, in the Third Judicial District: Court in and for Summit 
County. Judge Frederick found that there had been a material 
change in circumstances and thereby terminated alimony. 
The parties were divorced on July 8, 1986. At the time the 
Decree was entered, the respondent was an airline pilot for 
Western Airlines. At the time the Decree was entered the 
respondent was earning Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) per 
month. The appellant, at the time the Decree was entered, was 
earning Six Hundred Eighty Dollars ($680.00) per month. 
The trial court awarded the appellant 1,423.45 shares of 
Western Airlines stock, One Thousand Dollars ($1,000-00) per 
month as alimony, an interest in respondent's retirement, "Plan 
A,M in the sum of Twenty-Two Thousand Two Hundred Twelve Dollars 
and Fifty Cents ($22,212.50), and an interest in respondent's 
retirement, "Plan B," in the sum of Ninety-Six Thousand Seven 
Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars and Fifty Cents ($96,747.50). 
The respondent, at. the time the Decree was entered, could 
2 
not collect his retirement unless he retired, and appellant could 
not collect her interest in his retirement until respondent 
retired. Therefore, the appellant did not have access to these 
funds and could not receive these funds until respondent retired. 
Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, Delta Airlines 
purchased Western Airlines. This purchase altered the terms of 
respondent'a retirement plan and appellant xs now enabled to have 
immediate access to these funds, in cash, without retirement by 
her former husband. 
Iu 1988, respondent filed a petition for modification 
alleging that the availability of the retirement accounts to the 
appellant constituted a material change in circumstances which 
would justify the termination of alimony. 
At the time the petition foe modification was heard, the 
appellant was working part-time as a secretary, earning Six 
Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars ($625.00) per month and attending 
school full-time. Her expenses h^d increased only slightly since 
the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
At the same time, the responient's income was between Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) and Elev3n Thousand Four Hundred 
Dollars ($11,400.00) per month. The respon lent's expenses had 
increased also. The respondent had not convoyed the 1,423.45 
shares oE Western Airlines stock to the appellant. 
The Court found the value of the 1423.4C> chares of stock to 
be Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) and ordered that to be 
released to the appellant. The Count also found that the 
availability of the retirement account to the appellant 
constituted a substantial and material change in circumstance. 
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The Court awarded One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in 
immediate cash to the appellant for her interest in respondent's 
rotirement plans "A" and "B" and terminated alimony. 
During all times relevant herein, respondent has had the 
sole care, custody and control cf the parries' three minor 
children and has nevar been awarded support for these children 
from their mother, the appellant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGnMEBT 
1. The lower court did not abuse its discretion by finding 
that a material change had occurred and thereby terminating 
alimony. The fact that the retirement funds were accessible to 
the appellant constituted a substantial change in circumstance. 
2. The lower court did .ot abuse its discretion by 
"reducing" the appellant's share of the retirement funds that 
were awarded to her in the divorce decree. The lower court 
properl/ based its decision upon the future value of the One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in comparison to the flat 
sum of about One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($118,000.00) 
that the appellant was to receive at the time the respondent 
retired, potentially years in the future. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts have considerable discretion to adjust 
divorcing parties' financial interests. This discretionary power 
to fashion an equitable property division extends equally to 
subsequent modifications of an earlier decree. Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court's 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. Absent a 
showing of a clear abuse of discretion, the appellate court will 
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defer to the judgment of the trial court, due to its advantaged 
pos ition. 
A court may modify a prior divorce decree; however, the 
moving party must establish a "substantial change of 
circumstances which was not within the original contemplation of 
the parties or the court at the time the original decree was 
rendered." Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985). 
ARGUMENT 
POTNT I: THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR TN FINDING THE 
AVAILABILITY OF THE RETIREMENT FUNDS TO THE 
APPEI.IANT TO BE A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
WHICH JUSTIFIED THE TERMINATION OF ALIMONY. 
The original divorce decree clearly states that appellant 
was not to receive her share of the retirement funds until the 
respondent retired. At the time of the decree, the trial judge 
did not take into consideration that the appellant had immediate 
access to these funds, because she did not then have access to 
the funds. It was clearly within the discretion of the lower 
court to consider whether this One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000.00) distribution in immediate cash has so improved 
appellant's financial situation that the termination of alimony 
is proper. 
The Utah courts have often articulated that the purpose of 
alimony is "to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible 
at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charrje." Martinez v. 
Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 74 (Utah App. 1988). The Court has 
reiterated the three factors that must be considered by a trial 
court in determining support. Those factors are as follows: 
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(1) the financial conditions and needs of the requesting spouse, 
(2) the ability of the requesting spouse to provide a sufficient 
income for him or herself, and (3) the ability of the other 
spouse to provide support. Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 
(Utah App. 1988). Consideration of these factors in the instant 
case demonstrates the modification of the divorce decree was not 
an abuse of discretion of the lower court. 
The first factor is the financial condition and needs of the 
party seeking alimony. It is clear that these retirement funds 
were not immediately available to the appellant at the time 
alimony was awarded. She had a low income and no other 
significant assets. This is very different from appellant's 
current position. With immediate access to the One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) in retirement funds, the appellant 
is in a significantly improved financial situation. The 
investment of these funds would greatly add to the appellant's 
monthly income, yielding income of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) 
per month if invested at a rate of return as low as six percent 
(6%) per annum. Furthermore, since the decree was entered, the 
expenses of the appellant have increased only slightly. Most 
importantly, the appellant does not have the responsibility to 
provide any child support to the respondent, even though the law 
requires that both parents are responsible for the support of 
their children. 
The second factor to consider is the ability of the 
appellant to produce a sufficient income for herself. The 
appellant is able to work full-time, which would increase her 
salary so that she can meet her own living expenses. Appellant 
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is capable of earning Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00) per month. 
Appellant will also be receiving interest from the proceeds of 
the retirement funds and stock to add to her monthly income. At 
an interest rate of eight percent (8%) per annum, appellant can 
increase her income by approximately Seven Hundred Ninety Dollars 
($790.00) per month, by investing both the One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($100,000.00) of retirement money and the Eighteen 
Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) of stock funds. 
The third factor to consider is the respondent's ability to 
provide support. The current earnings of the respondent are 
between Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) and Eleven Thousand 
Four Hundred Dollars ($11,400.00), gross, per month. The 
respondent has the ability to provide support to the appellant. 
However, the respondent's expenses have gone up since the divorce 
decree was issued. Most importantly, it is the respondent who is 
the sole provider for the parties' three children and he will 
continue to be the sole provider. The court appropriately left 
his income in his home for the care of the children, for whom 
their mother, the appellant, provides no support. 
The appellant states that the trial judge is charged to 
consider pertinent circumstances when awarding alimony. The 
Court, in Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1985), considered 
the assets that were awarded to the wife when considering her 
financial condition. The assets that were awarded to the 
appellant herein were taken into consideration by the trial judge 
at the original trial. The original trial court was plainly 
aware of the fact that the retirement funds were not immediately 
accessible to the appellant. Therefore, when awarding alimony, 
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it was appropriate that the court did not place any weight on 
this asset in calculating what was immediately available to the 
appellant for her support. However, it must also have been in 
the contemplation of the original trial judge that the funds 
would be available when the husband retired and that concurrent 
with his retirement he would suffer a loss in income and be 
entitled to reduce or terminate alimony. This logical process 
has only been accelerated. 
The trial court appropriately considered all relevant 
factors when terminating alimony. The availability of the 
retirement funds was clearly a substantial change of circumstance 
that warranted the termination of alimony. 
POINT II: THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN "REDUCING* 
APPELLANT'S SHARE IN THE RETIREMENT FUNDS-
The appellant claims that the doctrine of res judicata 
applies in divorce action. Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 
P.2d 121, 123 (Utah App. 1988). This Court stated, in 
Throckmorton, that "the application of res judicata is unique in 
divorce actions because of their equitable doctrine which allows 
courts to reopen alimony, support or property division if the 
moving party can demonstrate a substantial change of 
circumstances since the matter was previously considered by the 
court." Supra. 
In this case, the moving party, the respondent, demonstrated 
before the lower court that there had been a substantial change 
in circumstance. Upon proof that there had been substantial 
change, it was well within the power of the lower court to make 
changes that are equitable. 
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The 1906 divorce decree slated that the appellant was to 
receive a flat One Hundred Eighteen Tliousand Nine Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($118,950.00) share in the retirement funds held by the 
respondent. This share was non-interest-bearing. Accordingly, 
the appellant was not going to receive her share of these funds 
until the respondent retired at some time in the future, 
potentially more than ten years away. At the time the decree of 
divorce was entered, a speci fic date was not set on which the 
appelJant was to receive the proceeds. 
At the time of the modification, in 1989, respondent was 
approximately 51 years of age. Judge Frederick found that the 
"reduction1' in appellant's interest in the retirement funds was 
appropriate based upon the present and future value of the One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), along with the assumption 
that respondent can continue to work until age 60. There 
existed, at the time of the modification trial, the substantial 
possibility that the appellant would not receive her funds for 
another nine years under the old order. Tf the appellant 
received a share of One Hundx^ ed Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) 
today, with earnings at a rate of eight per<:unt (8%), compounded 
only annually, over a nine-year peiiod, the One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($100,000.00) will have doubled. The appellant can 
realize an increase of over Eighty Thousand Dollacs ($80,000.00), 
in excess of the amount due her under the decree, if she receives 
those funds in 1989. It is the respondent who will suffer the 
loss tvhen this amount is removed from the retirement account. If 
the respondent were to leave this amount in his retirement fund 
until ht* retired, he would realise a significant Increase in the 
9 
value of the account to him, since appellant would not be 
entitled to receive any of the interest accrued during this 
period. 
The appellant is receiving an actual value of Eighty 
Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00) or more over and above what she was 
entitled to receive under the original divorce decree. The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by "reducing" the amount that 
appellant was to receive from the respondent's retirement funds. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court had discretion to modify the divorce decree 
based upon a substantial ch~. ge in circumstance. The trial court 
properly found that a substantial change in circumstance had 
occurred and, therefore, properly terminated alimony to the 
appellant. The trial court also used its discretion to "reduce" 
the appellant's share of the respondent's retirement fund to One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), now, or a future value of 
almost double what she would have otherwise been entitled to 
receive nine years from now. Based upon the fact that the 
appellant will receive more than was awarded to her in the 
original divorce decree, this decision was also proper. 
The modification order should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 17th day of October, 1989. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C/CQgPORON 
Attorjfey for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the respondent herein, and 
that I caused the foregoing Brief of Respondent to be served upon 
appellant by placing hand-delivering four true and correct copies 
of the same to: 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Appellant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
on the 17th day of October, 1989. 
MARY C. CORPOI 
Attorney'Tor Plaintiff/Respondent 
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